Not actually the declaration of Kosovo's independence in the form of a regional parliament's unilateral act passed on 17th February 2008, but rather the reaction of the International Community will influence not only political development in Serbia, but also the future character of international relations system on European and global level.|
In terms of international policy after World War II, current Kosovo status solution represents a precedent which is in conflict with fundamental objectives of the UN Charter among whose are "the establishment of such conditions in which it is conceivable to preserve justice and the esteem for commitments emerging from treaties and other sources of international law.” Although in Article No.1 the UN Charter guarantees the nations' right to self-determination, it simultaneously declares the respect for "the principle of the sovereign equality” of member states in Article No. 2 and in Paragraph No. 4 of the same Article it refuses explicitly "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN) (1).
The principles of sovereign equality that include legal equality of participating states, the right to territorial integrity as well as the refraining form any actions aimed against territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any member state, which are in conflict with UN Charter principles, belong to the key principles of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States adopted in the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final Act (2).
Although the 1999 NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia undertaken without the consent of the UN Security Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can be regarded as the breach of international law, the UN Security Council resolution No. 1244 dated 10th June, 1999, which is a fundamental and hitherto valid document amending the international status of Kosovo, respects the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the successor state of which is Serbia, and it clearly speaks of the autonomy of this region within Yugoslavia (3). The principle of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, or rather, Serbia, wasn't challenged by the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Interim Administration either (4). Yet in 2002, the then UN Secretary General Special Representative for Kosovo Michael Steiner defined eight key points, the so-called benchmarks, the fulfilment of which was supposed to become the pivotal condition of the commencement of negotiations on future province status. The meeting of democratic standards, the guarantee of the region's multi-ethnic character as well as the normalisation of relations with the central government in Belgrade were to precede the ultimate solution to the Kosovo status (5). Subsequently in December 2003, the UN Secretary General Special Representative Harry Holkeri and the Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi introduced the Standards for Kosovo, as it were, which were supposed to bring Kosovo nearer to EU criteria. These comprised topics like the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, Legal State, the Freedom of Movement, Sustainable Return and the Rights of Communities and their Members, Ownership Rights, Economy, Dialogue, Kosovo Protection Corps (6). Also the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of Kosovo's Status released by the members of the so-called Contact Group in November 2005 refer to the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244. Apart form other things, this document appeals to participating sides to "refrain from any unilateral steps” and exactly the first set of principles says that "the solution to the Kosovo issue must be compatible with the international standards of human rights, democracy and international law and it has to contribute to regional security” (7).
None of the documents in question deals with the establishment of an independent state. Thus, decision made by the US and the strongest EU member states means the denial of the entire legal framework through which the status of Kosovo was regulated. Moreover, the procedure of the acknowledgement was under way not only beyond the UN Security Council framework, which has been administrating Kosovo territory, but also beyond EU framework as on 18th February, 2008, the EU Council for External Affairs wasn't capable of attaining joint stance and let individual states to decide on such an important question according to their own will (8). The way in which independent Kosovo has been acknowledged, however, is first and foremost at odds with fundamental documents which amend international law in Europe, i.e. the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which has been a precedent in terms of European politics since the end of the World War II.
Europe after Kosovo
Even despite local acts of violence in northern Mitrovica, or rather, in Belgrade, we can speak of a relatively restrained reaction of Serbia meanwhile. In reprisal for this, Serbia confined itself to the recall of its ambassadors from particular countries instead of the originally announced interruption of diplomatic relations with states that have acknowledged Kosovo, (9). Nevertheless, demonstrations in the streets of Belgrade and moods in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the Kosovo issue stands for a trauma in the eyes of a considerable part of Serbian public.
Pessimistic expectations in connection with the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina have become partially real. Although the President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik has distanced himself from separatist tendencies, the National Assembly (Skupstina) threatens that if the majority of EU member states acknowledge Kosovo as an independent state, it will mean the creation of a new international principle and practice as for the recognition of the preferred right to "self-determination and separation” (10). The Assembly has also warned the central Government in Sarajevo that if Kosovo is acknowledged, the Parliament of Republika Srpska will reserve the right to hold a referendum on further relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the leader of independent social democrats Dodik has been stating that he will use the referendum as an instrument and that he would welcome its connection with parliamentary elections, the radical stream close to the oppositional Serbian Democratic Party and non-governmental organisations united in the Serbian Movement of Non-Governmental Organisations (SPONA) urges for independence declaration without a referendum (11). The way in which the Parliament in Banja Luka worded its resolution attests that as regards the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sword of Damocles will be hanging over this state unit for a very long time and the future arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina may re-land on the negotiating table again at any time.
In spite of that, however, the EU hasn't most probably expected such an outbreak of the citizens' dissatisfaction, primarily after the re-election of Boris Tadić as the President. The countries were taken unawares by the development and maybe therefore, for instance, Croatia and Hungary, but also the Czech Republic and Poland, are hesitant about recognising Kosovo's independence, although they stated originally that they wouldn't be that way (12).
In the immediate vicinity of Slovakia, however, the revival of Rusyn separatism scenarios in Transcarpathia dated back to the first half of 1990's stands for potential risk. Thus, for example, the Speaker of the Rusyn National Assembly (Sojm) Protoyerey Dimitry Sidor informed about declaration and self-determination which the Sojm was supposed to adopt on 15th December, 2007. Referring to alleged discrimination or even directly to the genocide of Rusyn nation, the declaration contains the request for the recognition of Transcarpathia as an autonomous territory under the control of Russia and the EU (13). Further epicentres of separatist tendencies started to appear in Ukraine, for instance, in Crimea. Notwithstanding their being in majority, the Crimean Tatars are loyal to Ukrainian statehood, Refat Chubarov, the Vice-Chair of the Crimean-Tatar nation's unofficial umbrella organisation Mejilis which represents the members of this ethnic group, stated that "along with Kosovo's declaration of independence the question of the self-determination of the Crimean-Tatar nation has been brought up to date (14). Anyway, the Party of Regions deputy Inna Bogoslovskaya warned that there might by potential separatist tendencies in Chernivecka Region near Romanian borders where 70 per cent of adults have Romanian passport (15). The potential risk of separatism in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine might represent the planned Party of Regions congress of all-level deputies summoned on 1st March, 2008, which is supposed to deal predominantly with the status of Russian language in Ukraine. The place, where the congress will be held, hasn't been chosen by chance since in Northern Donetsk in autumn 2004 an analogous assembly took place. The result of this assembly was the unsuccessful initiative of the establishment of South Eastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic. Similar local sources of potential separatism are often exaggerated and predominantly in Ukraine, they are used as a tool within internal political battle for power on statewide level. In any case, they have the effect of destabilisation and contribute to the growth of tension throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe.
Kosovo's independence and separatist tendencies in the Caucasus
Separatist problems in the area of the former USSR stretch also to the territory of Russia (RF) where this problem pertains mainly to the territory of Chechnya (partially Ingushetia and Dagestan too) and Tatarstan. Other strong separatist tendencies occur in the Moldovan region of Transnistria and, to a certain extent, also in Gagauzian Republic in Moldova inhabited primarily by Christian Turks (16). In Georgia, there are hitherto unsettled conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the past, there were distinct separatist efforts in the Adjaria province. In the territory of Azerbaijan lies an unrecognised republic of Nagorno-Karabakh because of the territory of which a war on Armenia was waged.
According to the statement of the Armenian Ambassador Ashot Hovakimian for Despite Borders there are no obvious reasons why the acknowledgement of Kosovo as a subject of international law shouldn't set precedent for other regions of the world. He at the same time referred to the nations' right to self-determination which is from the point of view of Armenian diplomacy put into practice in the course of the deciding on the Kosovo and Metochia status. This point was presented on 18th February, 2007, by the Armenian President Serge Sarkisian with a supplement that it isn't necessary to apply the model of the acknowledgement of Kosovo's independence to Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Sarkisian the reason is the different historical background of the process of state establishment. In his opinion Karabakh became independent on the basis of legal regulations valid in the territory of the USSR in the period of Nagorno-Karabakh's independence declaration (17). This attitude was repeated also by the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Tigran Torosian who added that Nagorno-Karabakh would be recognised independently of the situation in Kosovo (18). In general, in the case of Armenian political elites and diplomacy we may speak of the search for own solution to Nagorno-Karabakh issue which manifests itself also in solidarity with Serbia if the Kosovo precedent is applied (19).
According to the Azerbaijani diplomatic sources Azerbaijan rejects the linkage of the Kosovo status question and the Nagorno-Karabakh status question. The stance of Azerbaijan is that all existing conflict are supposed to be settled according to international law which doesn't encompass the possibility of a unilateral separation of the territory on the basis of the nation's right to self-determination. According to the ambassador such an option represents the violation of international right. This factual precedence may stir up the destabilisation of the situation in South Caucasus and other regions within the post-Soviet room. Therefore Azerbaijan's attitude to the Kosovo status issue is that the solution is to be attained on the basis of a mutual agreement between the representatives of Kosovo and Serbia. According to Ismailov such an attitude is founded on the respect for the principles of the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. He added that separatist forces as well as groups behind them plan to abuse the Kosovo precedence in order to achieve their own objectives.
Like Azerbaijan, also Georgia repeats in the interest of preserving territorial integrity that Kosovo doesn't set precedent for separatist regions in its territory. However, on 13th February, 2008, the President Mikheil Saakashvili said that alarming signals mentioned in the context of Kosovo's independence appeared in relation to Albania and South Ossetia in Tbilisi (20).
Separatist forces in South Caucasus and Moldova are specific due to integration on the level of the groupings of unacknowledged states, i.e. the Commonwealth of Unrecognized States (CUS) and the Organisation for Democracy and Nations' Rights. Three of them, namely South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, function within both existent groupings. All four unacknowledged countries coordinate their steps in terms of the working sessions of the Foreign Affairs Ministers.
After such a session in June 2007, the Foreign Affairs Minister of South Ossetia Murat Dzhioyev proclaimed that the case of Kosovo wasn't a precedent on the basis of which the unacknowledged post-Soviet republics could have asserted their right to independence. According to his words this right appertains to these republics irrespective of the Kosovo case and they will keep on asking for independence acknowledgement regardless of Kosovo. In Dzhioyev's opinion, however, another problem is the fact that if the International Community recognises Kosovo's independence, this decision will automatically become a precedent in relation to the autonomy of other countries that ask independence acknowledgement. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba maintained after the mentioned session that in the case of Abkhazia there were more reasons for independence (21).
Such statements were supported by the Russian President Vladimir Putin who said in July 2007 that there was no difference between the Kosovo problem and the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria where parliaments as well as presidents are elected and constitutions passed. This statement was warmly welcomed by the representatives of separatist republics united in the CUS and repeatedly interpreted in the sense of the rightfulness of claim to the acknowledgement of independence by other states (22). Taking this fact into account, in Putin's opinion it wasn't comprehensible why different principles should have been applied as regards these question. As early as the beginning of 2006, the President Putin tasked the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov with enforcing that the validity of the decision made by the International Community in connection with Kosovo was recognised as universal, i.e. applicable also to unacknowledged republics in the post-Soviet area (22).
The representatives of separatist republics refer to the extermination committed by their mother countries, factual independence, existent institutions, high democratic standards, conducted referendums on autonomy, the existence of state symbols etc. For example, at a press conference on 10th November 2006, the President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoyty stated referring to referendum and presidential elections that in the case of South Ossetia there were more reasons for independence acknowledgement than in the case of Kosovo. In April 2007, the Secretary General of the Interparliamentary Assambly of the Commonwealth for Democracy and Nation's Rights Grigory Marakuca declared that in the case of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, Western countries referred to human rights violation and ethnic cleansings, however, the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had had the same cause. That's why they have right to sovereignty according to him (24).
We may further mention the statements of Murat Djiodjyev dated 21st June, 2007, and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Transnistria Valery Lickay dated 16th June, 2007. The statements of Valery Lickay followed the mentioned meeting of the ministers of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh held in Tiraspol on 15th June, 2007. Having signed the common declaration, Lickay said that based on the development of negotiations on the future Kosovo status in the UN Security Council the diplomacies of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh would prepare another common declaration addressed to the UN Security Council.
At the session of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Democracy and Nations' Rights in June 2007, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Transnistria Yevgeny Shevchuk referred to the future possibility of obtaining independence emerging from hitherto unrealised Kosovo precedent. The President of Abkhazia Sergey Bagapsh proclaimed that the countries agreed on joint steps with regard to the acquisition of independence. Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue in the announced steps. On 17th February, 2008, the President of Abkhazia Sergey Bagapsh said that these two separatist countries planned to ask the Russian Federation, CIS states and the UN for the acknowledgement of Independence any day now. The President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoyty confirmed these words (25).
In the case of separatist republics in post-Soviet area it's possible to speak analogically of de facto and de jure precedent in accordance with de facto and de jure independence model. The factual precedent will be manifested in the shape of the distinct destabilisation of the areas with an enormous risk of armed conflicts restoration. This will be manifested independently of the fact whether there is the confirmed provision, which excludes the Kosovo case from precedent definition, in the whole of documents adopted within international organisations. The precedent is thus understood as the possibility of applying an analogous step in accordance with all cases except for Kosovo. This inconsistency in terms of the precedent used to be apparent in the past and it will be apparent in the future as well. Regardless of the extent of the correctness of diverse legal interpretations, a real precedent for applying, and probably also fulfilling, requests for the acknowledgement of the independence of various separatist regions has been created.
Defused conflict in Transnistria
In contrast to separatist republics in South Caucasus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in particular, the declaration of Kosovo's independence hasn't revived another "frozen conflict” in Transnistria for now. Anyway, it's first of all the consequence of the coming together of the Presidents of Moldova and Russia, namely Vladimir Voronin and Vladimir Putin, which started yet in 2006 when Moldova signed a disadvantageous agreement with Gazprom. This convergence was on the one hand the result of economic pressure of Russia which had used its monopoly on energy materials supplying for Moldova, but on the other hand the consequence of the failed President Voronin's attempts to achieve a progress in the re-integration of Transnistria via the collaboration with the EU and international organisations.
In April 2007, Russia offered Moldova new concepts of Transnistrian conflict solutions which presupposed the recognition of Transnistrian authorities by Moldova, voluntary dissolution of Moldovan and Transnistrian Parliament as well as the calling of new elections in both parts of the country. Transnistria would have thus gained 18, or rather, 19 seats in the Moldovan Parliament, which would have corresponded to Transnistrian share of the country's inhabitants as well as the claim for the representation in the central government through the first Vice-PM and State Secretary in every ministry. Russian plan, however, presupposed the preservation of Transnistrian army and security structures that were under Russian influence. Moldova would have had to commit itself to parliamentary neutrality and simultaneously respect the deployment of Russian troops in its territory in a period of two years with possible further prolongation (26). In April 2007, Russia restricted the embargo on the import of Moldovan agricultural products except for wine (27). Moldovan convergence with Russia was confirmed by the absence of the President Voronin at the GUAM Summit in Azerbaijani Baku held from 18th to 19th June, 2007, and the subsequent visit of the Russian Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref to Chisinau on 28th and 29th August, 2007, who negotiated with the representatives of Moldova on Russian investments in power engineering, infrastructure construction, information technologies development and agriculture. Close links between Putin and Voronin, who wants to solve the problem of Transnistrian re-integration prior to the end of his term of office in 2009, were confirmed also by their meeting in Novo-Ogarevo on the eve of an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 21st February, 2008. The issue of Transnistria was a part of his agenda too.
In the case of Transnistria Russia has probably staked on the cooperation with the Government in Chisinau. Contrary attitude would bring the definitive loss of influence in Moldova, which can be an advantageous partner for Russia form the viewpoint of investment possibilities as well as contacts with EU countries. That's why Moscow has been limiting the activities of the representatives of separatist region meanwhile. Although the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the so-called Transnistrian Moldovan Republic maintained in connection with the origin of independent Kosovo that " the Kosovo model of conflict solution must be applied in the solutions to all conflicts with analogous political, legal and economic background” (28), other representatives of this separatist region are more restrained, for instance, the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic Yevgeny Shevchuk who dubbed the origin of independent Kosovo as "tough trial for the UN” (29). A part of the establishment, however, realises that in view of the Ukrainian orientation towards NATO membership, Transnistria would find itself in international isolation. Thus, for example, the Chair of the Supreme Soviet Council for Social Organisations, Youth Policy, Sport and the Media Vyacheslav Tobuch said that Transnistria hasn't got allies strong enough for potential declaration of independence (30).
Nonetheless, separatist tendencies appear also in the Gagauzian Republic which has inclined as an autonomous Moldavian region towards close collaboration with Russia since the beginning of 1990's. Activists from separatist forces argue concurrently that by using "double standards” and centralistic interventions Chisinau curbs Gagauzian autonomy. The growth of pro-Romanian moods among Moldovan public is another argument (31). While Russia relies on the grip on Moldova which it can gain thank to the links with official Chisinau, separatists' efforts in Gaguazia may serve solely as an additional element of Russian pressure on Moldova.
The unilateral acknowledgement of Kosovo's independence has destabilising effects from the short-term as well as long-term point of view. The consequence is another enfeebling of the role of international law and international institutions within global and European politics. Instead of efficient multilateralism, the US but also a considerable part of EU member states chose unilateral steps. In the case of Kosovo, the traditional European negotiation culture was in fact replaced by policy dictated from the position of power. Thus the UN as well as the EU was eliminated from the decision-making process. The decision was adopted without the consent of the state to the jurisdiction of which Kosovo is still subordinate at least from the formal viewpoint. Last but not least, the solution to Kosovo question implies the legalisation of the possibility of state border change through a violent way.
From the perspective of Slovakia's strategic interests, similar trends pose a threat since as a small state Slovakia cannot rely on the efficiency of bilateral alliances not to speak of an independent acting, or rather, the ad hoc alliances tactic. Therefore the unilaterally declared Kosovo's independence, which isn't based on international institutions' resolution and which furthermore represents the variant of the Munich Agreement from 1938, isn't of its interest. The only difference lies in the fact that the then world powers at least managed to inform the Czechoslovak delegation about their decision after the end of negotiations. In the interest of the keeping of peace and stability around the world, Slovakia is obliged not to participate in the creation of more than a risky precedents leading to the escalation of tension and the destabilisation of situation in countries which the Slovak Republic subscribes to as their foreign political partner.
Solution to the Kosovo status confirmed that as far as fundamental questions of foreign policy are concerned, the EU isn't ready to undertake common steps and notwithstanding the progress in terms of institutional reform, the focus of decision-making processes remains in the hands of national states in this field. The failure of the EU in the case of Kosovo attests to the fact that the sceptics, who doubted its potential to become a global player in the medium term, have been right.
Anyway, the unilateral acknowledgement of independent Kosovo brings further questions too. In which way will the current solution to the Kosovo issue affect the political as well as institutional model of the solution to the status of ethnic minorities in Europe? If the EU wasn't capable of achieving a consensus as for the future region status, will it at least be able to push through its values in the course of the realisation of the controlled independence of Kosovo and secure the abiding by democratic principles as well as the principles of legal state and ethnic minority rights protection? To what degree will the EU be capable of reflecting on one level the fierce entry of Russia into European and global politics, on another level the loss of the prestige and moral authority in the Balkans and the former USSR?
Finally, the way in which the acknowledgement of Kosovo's independence was carried out has split Europe. It has split the European Union, but at the same time it has contributed to the division of the continent into winners and losers, into countries which profit from the diplomacy of bare facts and countries which feel to be endangered by such steps. The case of Kosovo creates new dividing lines in Europe dividing it into spheres of influence because it enables also other states, Russia in particular, to use separatist tendencies in order to reinforce their own power influence. In the last analysis, it is the European Union which pays for it. Not only Serbia, but also countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, i.e. countries that subscribe actively to the idea of European integration, have been abandoning it.
1) The United Nations Organisation Charter. San Francisco, 26th June, 1945. (Slovak version Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Slovak Republic; http://www.mzv.sk).
2) Helsinki Final Act. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – Final Act. Helsinky 1975. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf
3) Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10th June 1999. New York, U.N. Security Council.
4) Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 – 15th May 2001. http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm
5) Steiner, Michael: Address to the Security Council. Special Representative of the Secretary-General. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 30 July 2002. UNMIK/PR/792.
6) Standards for Kosovo. UNMIK, Prishtina 10th December 2003. http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/docs/leaflet_stand_eng.pdf
7) The Contact Group's Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status. November 2005. KIM Info-service. News from Kosovo and Metohija, 14th November 2005. http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2005/November_15/2.html
8) General Affairs and External Relations. Brussels, 18th February 2008, 2851st Council meeting. Council of the European Union. 6496/08 (Presse 41). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/
9) Tadić: Serbia won't recognise Kosovo, however, it won't isolate itself. TASR, 21st February, 2008.
10) Parlament Srpske usvojio Rezoluciju o Kosovu. Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske, 22nd February, 2008. http://rtrs.tv
11) Alić, Anes: Bosnian Serbs protest over Kosovo. ISN Security Watch, 22nd February, 2008. http://www.isn.ethz.ch
12) Prague: We owe it to Serbia. B 92, 22nd February, 2008; Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia to wait with recognition. B 92, 22nd February, 2008. http://www.b92.net
13) Rusiny Zakarpaťja trebujut nezavisimosti ot Ukrainy. ROL, 22nd February, 2008. http://www.rol.ru/news/misc/newssng/08/02/22_173.htm
14) Čubarov: s provozglašenijem nezavisimosti Kosovo aktualizirujetsia vopros samoopredelenija krymsko-tatarskogo naroda. Jedinoe otečestvo, 19th February, 2008. http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/main/20082/1927.htm
15) Inna Bogoslovskaja: „Možem polučiť samoprovozglašenije Bukovinskoj respubliki." Daily.UA, 21st February, 2008. http://www.daily.com.ua/articles/4/2008-02-52500.html
16) Ivan Burgudži: Gagugazija po sravneniju s Kosovo imejet namnogo boľše prav na samoopredelenije. Lenta PMP, 23rd February, 2008 http://www.tiras.ru/clanok.php?subaction=showfull&id=1203428201
17) NKR budet priznana vne zavisimosti ot Kosovo. Panarmenian Network, 19th February, 2008 http://www.panarmenian.net/news/rus/?nid=24922
18) Saakašvili: Kosovo Gruzii ne primer! Pravda, 14th February, 2008 http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/14-02-2008/255928-saakashv-0
19) Kosovo: Armenija ne verit v precedent. Azerbajdžanci v Rossii, 21st February, 2008 http://www.azeri.ru/papers/echo-az_info/13929/
20) Predstaviteli Abchaziji, Južnoj Osetii, Karabacha i Pridnestrovja: Kosovo dajet šans lideram mirovoj politiki. Regnum 16.6.2007 http://www.regnum.ru/news/843948.html
21) Sodružestvo nepriznannych gosudarstv. Newsru.com, 14th February, 2006. http://www.newsru.com/background/14jun2006/sng2.html
22) Informacionno-analitičeskij vestnik Soobščestva za demokratiju i orava narodov, 28th December, 2007 http://community-dpr.org/news/world/news_full.php?nid=1452&
23) Vladimir Putin postavil zadači diplomatii i armii. Kommersant, 31st January, 2006. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=645102
24) Otvet „nepriznannych". Vremia Novostej Online, 6th April, 2007. http://www.vremya.ru/2007/60/5/175653.html
25) Abchazija i Južnaja Osetija v odin deň obraťatsia k miru priznať nezavisimosť. Pridnestrovije prisojedinitsia. Newsru.com, 21st February, 2008. http://www.newsru.com/world/21feb2008/independ.html
26) Socor, Vladimir: Voronin pressured to accept Russian settlement plan for Transnistria. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13th April, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_
27) Konończuk, Wojciech – Rodkiewicz, Witold: Nowy rosyjski plan uregulowania problemu Naddniestrza. Warszawa, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 25th Apríl, 2007. http://www.osw.waw.pl
28) Transnistria presumes Kosovo model should be used for all analogous conflicts. Moldova.Azi, 19th February, 2008. http://www.azi.md/print /48198/En
29) Spiker parlamenta Pridnestrovja: Vopros priznanija nezavisimosti Kosovo budet serjoznym ekzamenom dlia OON. IA Regnum, 18th February 2008. http://www.regnum.ru/news/959031.html
30) Viačeslav Tobuch: U Pridnestrovija net siľnych sojuznikov dlia priznanija. IA Regnum, 22nd February, 2008. http://www.regnum.ru/news /961639.html
31) Gagauzskij pravozaščitnik: Kosovskij precedent daet osnovanije dlia nezavisimosti Gagauzii. IA Regnum, 19th February, 2008. http://www.regnum.ru/news /959468.html